This article provides an explanation for Thailand's long-term policymaking patterns from 1980 to 2011, with particular reference to macroeconomic and industrial policies. It develops a typology of reform orientations in Thailand, conditioned by government type (strong or fragmented) and rulingcoalition type (unelected or elected elites). When under strong leadership, reform was substantively implemented; its orientation was forged into fiscal tightening and "exclusive industrial policy" when ruled by unelected elites (Prem, Anand, and Surayud), but into an expansionary budget and "inclusive industrial policy" when ruled by elected elites (Chatichai and Thaksin). In contrast, when under multi-party governments, political leaders were less capable of pursuing meaningful reform and ended up with either internationally dominant discourses (Chuan and Abhisit) or pork-barrel projects (Banharn and Chavalit). It is further argued that government type hinges upon constitutional design while the two-elite struggle has resulted from the political turmoil of the prior decade. The assessment of reform outcomes requires a rethinking of the relationship between inflation, macroeconomic stability, and growth; and of institutional prerequisites for industrial policymaking. Policy suggestions entail constitutional redesign and the redressing of macroeconomic and industrial balance.
Introduction
Up until the 1970s the modernization approach had dominated the literature on Thailand's political economy by characterizing the country as a "bureaucratic polity" (Riggs 1966 ).
Subsequently, the power of civil and military bureaucracy was depleted by popular uprisings and organized business (Morell and Chi-Anan 1981; Anek 1988) . Since then, the country has undergone dramatic change. Despite being one of only 13 countries that have sustained growth of more than 7% over at least 25 years (Commission on Growth and Development 2008), Thailand was ground zero for the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis, then rapidly recovered against all odds, before ending the 2000s in political turmoil.
Neoclassical, Marxist, dependency, and institutionalist schools have been in competition for conceptualizing post-1980 dynamism (see review in Hewison 2006) . In line with the institutional turn across the social sciences, the institutionalist accounts have gained wider currency over time in Thailand. However, the dominant institutionalist explanations are seriously flawed in two ways. In terms of political analysis, they do not consider institutions as, at least temporally, prior to individuals, thereby downplaying the role of constitutional design in shaping human behaviors (e.g. Doner and Ramsay 1997; Khan 2010; Kuhonta 2011) . In terms of economic analysis, they are based on mistaken assumptions about the relationship between inflation and growth; and about the institutional prerequisites for industrial policymaking (e.g. Christensen et al. 1993; Doner and Ramsay 1997; Doner 2009 ).
This article provides an alternative institutionalist explanation for Thailand's long-term policymaking patterns and their economic consequences from 1980 to 2011, with particular reference to macroeconomic and industrial policies, and the relationship between them. The discussion breaks down into four sections. It begins with an elaboration of the background of my two institutional variables, that is, ruling-coalition type and government type. The second section demonstrates the four economic reform paths alternated in the past three decades: (a) fiscal tightening and "exclusive industrial policy"; (b) an expansionary budget 4 and "inclusive industrial policy"; (c) international conformism; and (d) provincial, porkbarrel projects. Following this is the re-examination of the economic consequences of such reforms. The thinking of past performances and future prospects requires a debunking of the linear relationship between inflation, macroeconomic stability, and economic growth, as well as the overstatement of institutional prerequisites for industrial policymaking. The last section summarizes the findings and places them within a more general debate about the determinants of within-country growth patterns.
I. Coalition and Constitutional Dynamics in Post-1980 Thailand
My explanation for the variation in Thailand's reform paths rests on two institutional variables, that is, ruling-coalition type and government type. This section elaborates on the background of these two factors. Regarding ruling-coalition type, the tussle between the unelected and elected elites has been the fundamental de facto institution that shapes post-1980 Thailand's political landscape. The ruling coalitions during the past three decades have been led by either type of elites, both of which have differing incentives for reform.
Regarding government type, it is constitutional design -a key de jure institution -that determines the capability of a government to implement reform at will. Put together, my framework can be schematically summarized, as shown in Figure 1 . 
Elite Struggle and Ruling-coalition Type
As a result of Thailand avoiding being fully colonized 1 in the late nineteenth century, the traditional elite, centering on the monarchy, has long maintained its power and prerogative.
The 1932 revolution toppled the absolute monarchy and plunged the country into the "bureaucratic polity", in which the state apparatus and policymaking were controlled by military and civilian bureaucrats. Not until the chaotic 1970s were the unelected elites challenged by non-bureaucratic groups, especially college students, peasants, and the urban middle class.
The emergence of the two-horse race
The so-called "semi-democratic" regime emerged in 1980 as a compromise between democratic movements and the monarchy-military alliance. However, it was the local businessmen-turned-politicians -not students, workers or peasants -who seized most of the power distributed from the unelected elites, mainly because of their coordination with the status quo in suppressing mass politics. On the one hand, provincial businessmen allied themselves with the military in supporting the campaigns against communism led by the state-initiated Village Scouts (Bowie 1997) . On the other hand, they reinvested their profits in the social services (e.g. sponsoring funerals, subsidizing schools, money lending), supplementing the state's sparse provision and paving their way to parliament. The proportion of businessmen in the House of Representative grew from 19.2% in 1933 19.2% in to 37.2% in 1979 19.2% in (Anek 1988 .
Amid the messy democratization process, Thai politics has been characterized by the ongoing struggle between the two groups of elite. The traditional or unelected elite is the alliance between the monarchy, military, legal and economic technocrats, and the Democrat Party. The unelected elite comprises elected politicians, provincial businessmen, and local 6 mafias. With different power bases, the reform incentives of the elected and unelected elites vary to a significant degree. The basic characteristics of the two groups of elite are summarized in Table 1 . 
Common Characters
Preferences toward centralized state with ambiguous regulation (to retain discretionary power), the neglect of human rights, freedom of speech and environmental issues
Two caveats should be noted within this two-elite struggle theme. First, the two elites by no means play a zero-sum game at all times. They are not always competing with one another.
As previously asserted, both groups coordinated in suppressing the mass movements of the late 1970s. Thereafter, competition, collaboration, and compromises have all been observed.
Moreover, both camps not only have internal contradictions and cliques within but they also share overlapping social networks such as having common family and school ties. 
Constitutional Design and Government Type

Deficiency by design
The existing literature usually considers multi-party governments along with intra-party factionalism to be the result of politicians' misbehaviors and personal incompetence (e.g. Suchit 1996; Kuhonta 2011). Delving deeper into the politics of the electoral system, I
argue that Thailand's fragile, multi-party governments are the result of constitutional design.
Constitutional structures have functioned as the key de jure institution determining the capabilities of Thai political leaders for policy implementation. The power to overhaul constitutions has virtually always been in the hands of the unelected elites. To retain the upper hand, the most significant tools designed to perpetuate fragmented politics in parliament and to impede party institutionalization are: (1) the multi-member plurality electoral system, widely called the Block Vote; (2) the appointed Senate; and (3) the relaxed regulations for party-switching. All three regulations featured in all but the 1997 Constitution, as summarized in Table 3 . 1983 , 1986 , 1988 and 1995 (Hicken 2004 ).
Distinct from others was the 1997 Constitution, designed to create strong party and stable government. It changed the electoral system to the single-member districts, which effectively reduced the intra-party conflicts and drew voters to policy issues. In addition to the 400 single-seat constituencies, there were 100 MPs selected via proportional representation from party lists, with a 5% threshold. Senators were all elected. Partyswitching was discouraged. Put together, the party leaders had far greater leverage over members of their own parties. Being sidelined by Thaksin and his single-party government, the old oligarchy and the monarchy staged the coup and redesigned the 2007 Constitution to weaken political parties and the elected yet again (Ginsburg 2009; Hewison 2010) .
Predictable outcomes
In eight general elections held between 1979 and 1996, no political parties attained a majority. The largest parties won between 21.9% and 31.8% of all MPs' seats. On average, there were 16 political parties competing in an election, with the effective number of coalition parties around 6.0 (Chambers and Croissant 2010) . With the Block Vote, split returns occurred in over 50% of the districts (Hicken 2009: 97) . Factional conflicts, both intra-and inter-party, led to the downfall of 5 of 11 governments. Cabinets in the 1990s
lasted an average of only nine months (Kuhonta 2011: 167) . Moreover, each leading coalition party lost the subsequent elections because of deteriorating cohesion and financial problems (Tamada 2012 ).
The 1997 here is conditioned by two factors: (a) government type (strong or fragmented party); and (b) ruling-coalition type (unelected or elected elites). When under strong governments, reform was substantively implemented; its orientation was forged into fiscal tightening and "exclusive industrial policy" when ruled by unelected elites, but into an expansionary budget and "inclusive industrial policy" when ruled by elected elites. In contrast, when under fragmented, multi-party governments, political leaders were not capable of, and deterred from, pursuing meaningful reform; instead, they either resorted to internationally dominant discourses or provincial, pork-barrel projects.
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Fiscal Tightening and Exclusive Industrial Policy
If industrial policy is ideally defined as "a policy aimed at affecting particular industries (and firms as their components) to achieve the outcomes that are perceived by the state to be efficient for the economy as a whole" (Chang 2006: 109) , then Thailand has never implemented any industrial policy. To make it more relevant, I further identify exclusive and inclusive industrial policies. "Exclusive industrial policy" takes place when sectoral policies were made to favor only a couple of firms that are close to the government. The policymaking in this case may entail some efficiency-driven aspects, such as measures to ensure scale economies, but it is neither formulated openly nor announced publicly as part of a national development strategy. More importantly, as praised by the World Bank (1993: 7), whenever selective interventions have threatened macroeconomic stability, the latter takes precedence over the former. This policy character is found in the unelected elite-led governments of Prem, Anand, and Surayud, albeit to various extents and depths. Lacking electoral mandate, these administrations leaned on macroeconomic technocrats, usually from the Bank of Thailand (BOT) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), as a legitimate excuse, and therefore set fiscal reform as the overriding priority. For most macroeconomic technocrats, industrial policy has been considered a market-distorting measure that adversely affects price mechanism and resource allocation. However, the unelected elites either have their own business (e.g. the Crown Property Bureau -CPB) or have an intimate relationship with a handful of tycoons. When necessary or being requested, certain privileges would be granted to these crony firms.
Prem, 1980-1988
The Prem premiership represents the strongest form of this reform path. During 1979-81 the current account deficit widened to 7.1% on average, while inflation climbed up from 9.9% to 19.7% and 12.7%. After trial and error, 4 the technocrats were vested with the autonomy and authority necessary to maintain macroeconomic stability. The baht devaluation, and subsequent pegging to a basket of currencies in 1984, was regarded as "the single most important policy step since abandoning the multiple exchange rate system in 1955" (Bowie and Unger 1997: 143 Second, a well-planned policy toward petrochemicals was pursued as part of the country's most notable mega-projects, the Eastern Seaboard Development Plan (henceforth ESDP). The ESDP provoked controversies when the Thai economy suffered from macroeconomic difficulties, with most sub-projects being delayed or diverted. However, compared to other projects, the petrochemical complexes enjoyed fewer delays of implementation. As detailed in Lauridsen (2008) , the sectoral policy was strategically planned to ensure economies of scale of indigenous firms. The initial plan was a "onecompany, one-product" strategy, even though it turned out to be "two companies, one product" in actuality. Tax incentives, upstream-downstream coordination, and optimal use of the country's natural gas resources were encouraged. The Petrochemical Institute of Thailand was set up to provide a source of local expertise. Upstream production was controlled by the state-owned Petroleum Authority of Thailand and the National Petroleum Corporation, with 49% and 15.9% owned by the PTT and the CPB respectively. State intervention in petrochemicals earned Brownie points even from a neoclassical account (Christensen 1992) , and led Lauridsen (2008: 606) to conclude that "the Thai state was able to perform its demiurge and midwife roles in petrochemicals in a much more coherent manner than was normally the case in most other industries". 
Anand, 1991-1992
Under Anand, a technocrat-turned-businessman, reform was also made in the direction of fiscal tightening and exclusive industrial policy, albeit to a lesser extent than Prem. The pre-eminent reform was the introduction of value added tax (VAT) to broaden the country's tax base and to eliminate the ubiquitous business tax evasion. Antitrust laws were strengthened. Dozens of price controls on consumer items were lifted. Financial reforms were also prominent. Furthermore, interest rate ceilings were removed to foster competition among financial institutions. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was initiated (Bowie and Unger 1997) .
With regard to industrial and trade policies, the Anand government reduced duties on raw materials and ended bans on imports and new factories. Quotas in the textile industry 6 Established in the late 1950s, Tanin was competitive enough to export televisions and radios to Europe, the UK, and China. In 1983 it had a turnover of 800 million baht and was ranked third largest in domestic market shares behind two Japanese brands. The baht devaluation, an 18% growth-limited bank loan adopted by the BOT in 1984, and fiercer international competition led Tanin to liability for 630 million baht. In 1986 Tanin, with its 2,000 workers, requested a soft loan from the Prem government, which was rejected. The lender banks conditioned Tanin not to reinvest in the new production lines but to sell existing assets (from Manager Monthly various issues from 1984 to 1990).
were reallocated using a more transparent system and aimed at rewarding firms exporting to new markets. The BOI's Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD) was initiated to encourage the development of supporting industries. More importantly, it significantly liberalized the automobile industry by cutting tariffs and ending import bans.
Yet this was implemented in an exclusive fashion. Most auto firms were ripe for a more open, export-oriented strategy after a few protectionist decades. However, the Anand government did not hold a consultation with the private sector over the pace and magnitude of liberalization (Doner 2009: 248-9 ).
Further, as it was the unelected-led-government, the bureaucratic reform was steered toward the "pro-bureaucrat and anti-politician" direction (Bidhya 1994: 158) . For example, the power of ministers to appoint and to transfer senior officials was reduced, whereas the permanent secretary was given more authority to reshuffle the directors of line departments.
Rules and regulations were also changed in bureaucratic favor, such as increasing its authority to delay any implementation of government policies.
Surayud, 2006-2008
Surayud stepped down from the Privy Council to become prime minister. With the monarchy and military being the accent, budgets were dissipated on the ideological promotion of "sufficiency economy" and "gross national happiness". The military budget was increased by 34% and 28% in 2007 34% and 28% in and 2008 34% and 28% in respectively (McCargo 2008 . It also endorsed the Defense Ministry Administration Act of 2008 to limit the elected politicians' authority to appoint high-level military officers.
There was an outstanding macroeconomic bill, however. In December 2006 the BOT launched the 30% reserve requirement, Thailand's strongest anti-speculation measure, which was considered by foreign investors to be a "capital control". In use until February 2008, it ordered financial institutions to deduct 30% as a reserve requirement from shortterm (less than one year) foreign exchange transactions against the baht. The goal was to curb the sharp rise of the baht that was continuously hurting Thai exports. The measure slowed the baht's appreciation and triggered a 15% plunge in the stock market, thereby forcing the authorities to rescind some of the measures in the following days (Bangkok Post, October 1, 2010). Pridiyathorn Devakula, Finance Minister, argued that: "Of the two types of investment, investing in setting up a company in Thailand or investing in the Thai stock market, we must prefer the first type" (Nation, January 24, 2007).
The government also pursued industrial policy, with scale economies target, toward the Eco-Car project (budget cars with no more than 1300cc for benzene and 1500cc for diesel models). It was a step forward in Thailand's attempt to strengthen its position as the regional automotive production hub. Coaxed by the Industry Minister, the Board of Investment (BOI) launched the incentive scheme subject to certain requirements, most important of which was the firm's output, which was expected to reach 100,000 units by its fifth year in production (Bangkok Post, January 11, 2008).
Expansionary Budget and Inclusive Industrial Policy
The term "inclusive industrial policy", which I use in the case of elected elite-led 
Chatichai, 1988-1991
Chatichai Choonhavan was an elected prime minister who took office for the first time since the 1973-6 democratic spell. Although being in operation under the 1978 Constitution, elected politicians were relatively consolidated in taking power back from Prem and the military. 7 His cabinet positions were mostly politicians or party backers. Together they fought against technocrats over budgets, economic plans, and the rules for stationing senior officials. The government shifted funds from the military to support its schemes to promote growth, particularly in the provinces.
To expand the economy, the Chatichai government raised the fiscal budget by 10% and lifted the limit on public-sector foreign borrowing from US$1 billion (under Prem) to US$2.5 billion in 1990 (Doner 2009: 123) . The Finance Minister argued that the government needed to "accommodate economic expansion" and that it was "not important whether it's a balanced budget" (Christensen 1990: 179) . The minimum wage was raised by 25%. The Southern Seaboard Project to build deep sea ports gained preliminary approval (but was called off after the 1991 coup). Further endorsed large-scale infrastructure projects included: a second-stage expressway; Bangkok's railway system (known as the Sky Train);
and an advanced telecommunications scheme for 3 million landlines. The last one was then the largest investment ever to be made in Thailand (Christensen 1991: 200-2) . Even foreign policy was oriented toward economic growth by converting Indochina from "a battlefield into a trading market".
Notwithstanding valid claims of corruption and cronyism, industrial entrepreneurs and associations had a louder voice. As the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI) called for the reduction of import taxes on capital goods and machinery, most of the tariffs were reduced 20 to 5% in 1990, "marking a major policy revision." (Christensen 1991: 203) . The BOI, for the first time, launched an R&D tax incentive in 1989 by enforcing technology-transfer mandates in return for promotional campaigns (Felker 2001) . Although the government was poised to dissolve the BOI in 1990 due to the decline of investment applications, pressures from business groups talked the government into shifting the BOI's thrust from investment promotion to industrial development by focusing more on promoting Thai industries abroad and developing local subcontractors (Shain 1993 ).
Thaksin, 2001-2006
Thaksin Shinawatra is a tycoon-turned-politician who made his fortune through state 
International Conformism
The Democrat Party is ideologically conservative whose founders were royalist and aristocratic (Kuhonta 2011: 168) . The party has never won an outright majority, thus relying heavily on multi-party coalitions and traditional elite for political support. Under the Democrat-led governments, reforms were carried out in accordance with the world's dominant discourse of the time, namely, neoliberalism in the 1990s and Keynesianism in the late 2000s.
Chuan began his first term (1992-5) after the May 1991 clash that slashed the military power. Despite high expectations of reform, the government turned out to have a "legalistic and plodding decision-making style and a pronounced tendency to compromise rather than push for real change" (King and LoGerfo 1996: 105-6 [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] committed to neoliberal reform, especially in the financial sector, to the neglect of falling real sectors (Hewison 2005: 315) .
In terms of industrial policy, a series of skills development was initiated. The most ambitious effort was the Industrial Restructuring Program to upgrade 13 sectors, which ended in failure owing to weak business association involvement and the ministries' reluctance to give up resources to the quasi-autonomous institutes (Doner 2009: 128-9 ).
The Democrats took office again in December 2008, at the height of the global financial crisis. The Thai economy shrank by 2.3% and exports fell by 14%. Long criticizing Thaksin's expansionary programs, Abhisit called his 115-billion-baht stimulus package the Keynesian policy, arguing that: "This is…Keynesian policy which everybody is doing. I don't know of any country that is not pursuing this line. I don't know any school of thought that says we could be doing otherwise" (Nation, February 23, 2009 ). Key policies included the 15-year free education scheme, the skills' training scheme, the 500-baht monthly allowance for the elderly, excise and value-added tax waiver for diesel, and further subsidies for electricity, water, and transport. The military budget rose by 50% in the Abhisit government to reach a record high for the 2000s. Yet, the Abhisit administration also witnessed certain radical reform attempts such as the Land and Building Tax Bill.
However, with strong resistance from both elected and unelected elites, the bill was not 23 submitted to parliament until the end of his government.
Provincial and Pork-barrel Projects
The least productive reform was witnessed when Thailand was ruled by the weak coalition governments of Banharn and Chavalit. But this reform path is not totally futile. Roadbuilding projects, usually regarded as a pork-barrel policy, are a key means to integrating remote areas to the national and the world economy. Yet, compared to other paths, they yielded limited impacts.
As an MP for Suphaburi province, Banharn Silpa-archa raised 0.5% of the total state fund for highway constructions that the province received in 1966 to 11.9% in 1980, making him a source of collective pride among provincial voters (Nishizaki 20011 ).
However, national politics saw him as an unprincipled opportunist functioning as "the walking ATM", as the corruption reportedly amounted to half of all budget project funds (Doner 2009: 124) . Overall, policies of the Banharn government were driven by the logic of patronage and particularistic connections. His government was also involved in the Bangkok Bank of Commerce scandal, which heralded the 1997 financial crisis. Having benefited from defections from Banharn's party, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh constructed a sixparty coalition government . Even though the cabinet looked more economically competent than its predecessors, the capacity for any reform was institutionally constrained by fragmented politics. A tighter fiscal stance was proposed before the financial crisis, but caused intense opposition within the cabinet because they threatened to eliminate prized 
III. Economic Consequences of Reform Politics
Assessment of any reform hinges upon the economic theories that one uses as an analytical lens. With a focus on macroeconomic and industrial policies, this section seeks to redress the balance of both policies in the interpretation of Thailand's past performance and the thinking of future prospects. On the macroeconomic side, the assumed linear relationship between inflation and growth is fundamentally flawed, while on the industrial side the importance of institutional prerequisites is overstated.
Rethinking Macroeconomic Management and Consequences
Taking into account the varying reform paths discussed in the previous section, this article maintains that Thailand's relatively successful economic development has resulted from the combination of: (a) macroeconomic stability; (b) certain industrial policies; and (c) ad hoc bureaucratic and infrastructural restructuring. The realization of this combination really matters in the taking-stock-and-looking-ahead task, as it runs contrary to the conventional wisdom that considers "low inflation and hard budget constraints" to be Thailand's recipe for growth.
Many Thai specialists from either institutionalist or neoclassical traditions characterize the Thai political economy, mainly from 1980 to 2000, as the bifurcated state (e.g. Christensen et al. 1993; Warr and Bhanupong 1996; Doner and Ramsay 1997; Unger 1998; Thitinan 2001; Khan 2000 Khan , 2010 . The Thai state is bifurcated because it had institutionally been "divided between a centralized, insulated, and efficient set of macroeconomic agencies on the one hand and more politicized, fragmented sectoral agencies on the other" (Doner and Ramsay 1997: 248) . Even though sectoral policies were operated within a clientelistic setting, Thailand managed to achieve rapid growth largely as a result of 
The economics of inflation targeting
Developing countries have been convinced that macroeconomic stability is defined by low inflation, with a target of 1-3%. To "inflation hawks", controlling inflation is a means to achieving faster, more stable, and more equitable growth. This is, however, a downright myth. The relationship between inflation and economic growth does not proceed in a linear fashion. In the economics literature it is always about threshold.
Many studies show no statistically significant relationship when inflation falls below a certain level. For example, Barro (1997) , a veteran macroeconomist, finds no significant relation between economic growth and inflation when inflation falls below 8-10%. A more recent dynamic panel threshold model even concludes that, for developing countries, inflation hampers long-term economic growth only when it exceeds 17% (Kremer et al. 2013 ). Historically, moderately high inflation is compatible with rapid economic growth in many countries. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s, annual per capita income in South Korea was growing at 7%, in parallel with an average inflation rate of around 20% (Chang 2010) . For Korean policymakers at that time, the ultimate goal was economic growth, believing that "[l]ow growth increases unemployment and in turn political instability" (Haggard et al. 1994: 42) . In contrast, there is strong evidence that excessive anti-inflationary measures can adversely affect economic growth, output growth, employment rate, and poverty reduction. For many countries, the periods of low inflation have been among those with the slowest rates of economic growth, such as Argentina in and Brazil in 1996 -2003 . After all, inflation is just an intermediate variable, less important in its own right and more important for its impact on variables that are of greater concern, such as stability and growth (Stiglitz et al. 2006 ).
The politics of inflation crediting
Acknowledgement of the non-linear relationship between inflation and growth can have a more profound implication in political terms. To begin with, the bifurcated state argument, even applied to the pre-2000 period, overrates the "low inflation and hard budget constraints" factor in assessing Thailand's past performance, while the costs and negative impacts thereof, particularly on industrial upgrading, have not been taken into full consideration. For example, in the early 1980s, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) pushed the tariff restructuring plan, but the MOF was unwilling to cooperate on the grounds of fiscal health (Muscat 1994: 198) . A more recent example is the appeal from the Federation of Thai Industries in 2013, asking the BOT to help export sectors that had been hit hard by the unprecedentedly strong baht.
Manufacturing production continued to contract in line with restrained consumption and exports. The proposals included slashing the policy rate, controlling capital inflows, and switching from inflation targeting to exchange-rate targeting (Bangkok Post, April 27, 2013) . 8 All were firmly opposed again without a thorough investigation into the limitations and opportunity costs of maintaining exceptionally low inflation and hard budget constraints (e.g. the adverse impacts on exports and economic growth, the impediment to industrial restructuring).
Furthermore, even assuming away the limitations and opportunity costs of maintaining low inflation, this reform path has never come as a single piece, but offered within a more comprehensive package. With the unelected governments of Prem, Anand, and Surayud, fiscal tightening was pursued alongside pro-bureaucratic regulatory changes, delayed infrastructural upgrading, and considerable increases in military budgets. The resource misallocation and growth-impeding characters of this package deal should, at least, partly refute the bifurcated state claim as well as the political credibility lent to the macroeconomic agencies for Thailand's past economic development. In contrast, with allegedly more corruption-prone and populist packages, it was the strong governments run by elected elites that oriented the country into bureaucratic and infrastructural reforms, with a more systemic industrial policymaking.
Of course, this is not to say that the unelected administrations were economically worthless and elected politicians more worthwhile. Corruption and excessive expansionary programs led by elected politicians can do more harm than good, too. The point I am trying to make here is that the relative economic success of Thailand should not boil down largely to the "low inflation and hard budget constraints" factor. Industrial policies and ad hoc bureaucratic and infrastructural restructuring should be given greater weight, while the costs of a low-inflation regime demand careful scrutiny. Macroeconomy is a crucial part of sustaining growth. But if the ultimate goal is to maintain macroeconomic stability, there are a host of alternatives to inflation targeting (more on this below).
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Rethinking the Institutional Prerequisites of Industrial Policy
With the rise of new institutional economics, the institutional prerequisites for industrial policymaking, rather than industrial policy itself, have become a matter for major concern.
As Doner (2009: 56) states: "The question is not whether industrial policies…can promote growth, especially upgrading. They clearly can, but often do not…[A central point is]: more targeted policies require significant institutional strengths" (also in World Bank 1993). In the case of Thailand, inefficient bureaucracy and fragmented politics have been considered the two fundamental institutional deficiencies. Remedying these deficiencies is a sine qua non for effective industrial policymaking, the thinking goes. This part raises two neglected points in response to the overstatement of institutional prerequisites.
Institutional deficiencies and human defiance
To begin with, I argue that there are various political routes to overcoming institutional difficulties, even within one country. In the case of Thailand, the current success of petrochemicals and automobiles are mainly the result of industrial policy implemented in prior decades. For petrochemicals, the key political drive was the unelected elites, while in automobiles it was business associations and elected politicians.
In petrochemicals, the dominance of royal-owned Siam Cement Group, founded by King Rama VI in 1913 and now 30% owned by the CPB, plays an important role, "in particular during periods of close collaboration between the prime minister and the royal family, as during the Prem period" (Lauridsen 2008: 605) . Under political and bureaucratic fragmentation, CPB-owned companies can glue policy-makers together. Moreover, such fragmentation was not totally damaging. The third-party evaluation report of the ESDP by Shimomura (2000: 17) concludes that: "The military, the splinter parties, the technocrats, the conglomerates, the mass media and other groups continued to restrain each other in a unique web of checks and balances, and accordingly no single group was able to wield excessive power." In summary, since North (1990: 3) defined institutions as "the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction", most of the institutionalist literature has been directed toward the study of institutions as constraints. Accordingly, together with the rise of new institutionalism is the overestimation of institutional factors as the explanatory primacy for political-economic phenomena and the underestimation of the role of human agency (see theoretical discussion in Veerayooth 2012). There is plenty of room for agents to make deliberate choices, although the range of choices that agents make is limited by the ideas they hold and the structures they live in. Deliberate political actions have played a key role in overcoming deficient institutions throughout catching-up histories (see examples from Korea in Chang 1994) . Moreover, the relationship between political fragmentation and effective policymaking is not a linear one, as multi-party governments can provide a set of credible constraints on policy disruption and therefore bolster confidence among private actors (see Nooruddin 2011) . Greater attention should be paid to "exceptional" cases that cannot be explained by structurally determined conditions. In addition, changes in formal institutions, such as constitutions in Thailand, can improve capability for policy formulation and implementation.
Escaping from the Middle-income Trap
The findings and perspectives discussed thus far have led us to two critical suggestions as to how Thailand can move from middle-to high-income status. First and foremost, given that manufacturing competitiveness and export composition of high local value-added are the key attributes of successful catching up (see Veerayooth and Patarapong 2013; Felipe et al. 2012) , Thailand needs to tip the macroeconomic-industrial balance in favor of the latter.
On the one hand, macroeconomic stabilization is a necessity. However, apart from a problematic inflation-targeting regime, there are various options that can provide the overarching theme of maintaining macroeconomic stability. For example, maintenance of a competitive real exchange rate; implementation of capital management techniques; an explicit statement of output and employment goals; and incomes and anti-monopoly policies to limit inflation to moderate levels. To the extent possible, economic policy should focus on the variables of ultimate concern, such as efficiency, growth, and equity, rather than an intermediate variable like inflation (see Epstein and Yeldan 2009; Stiglitz et al. 2006) . On the other hand, industrial policymaking should be posited on the same level as other types of policymaking, be it education, health, or social policies, in the sense that it will certainly be confronted by problems and difficulties in terms of implementation, needless to say wasteful outcomes. But the tasks of policymakers and academics are to minimize such problems and to maximize the benefits. Moreover, almost all policies in reality inevitably favor certain sectors and actors over others, and therefore have discriminatory effects that amount to targeting (Rodrik 2008) . In Thailand strong governments of both unelected and elected elites had implemented industrial policies, mostly in an unsystematic manner. Therefore, designing it in a methodical way, with an explicit yardstick and exit strategy, should be a more productive and accountable enterprise than deploying it with blind prejudice. history, this sort of regulation has formally impeded the capacities and incentives of political leaders for reform, and informally forced the compromise between the two elites.
As seen in the Yingluck government , forced compromise discounted the possibility of bureaucratic reform, industrial upgrading, tax reforms, and military budget cuts. To please its constituencies without alienating its constitutionally empowered enemies, the Yingluck government, albeit with a landslide election victory, moved toward more populist policy packages, including the rice-pledging scheme, farm debt moratorium, rebates and tax cuts. 10 If institutions are seen -as most institutionalists believe -as being temporally prior to individuals, the current constitution is functioning as a reform obstruction.
10 However, the Yingluck government also endorsed the 300-baht minimum wage (40% increase), the second phase of Eco-Car project, and investment plans for high-speed railway and infrastructural megaprojects.
IV. Conclusion: Within-country Growth Dynamics
Since the 1980s Thailand has undergone political-economic dynamics beyond the single- This article hopes to offer a more subtle reform variation than characterized by Khan, and sheds more light on the constructive role of a formal institution like constitutions in shaping reform capability. In line with Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) , my explanation for differing reform paths is based on the interaction between de jure (constitutional design) and de facto (coalition politics) institutions. However, this article contends that growthenhancing behaviors can take place despite -and sometimes because of -deficient institutions. Moreover, regarding underlying economic theory for interpreting growth outcomes, I find the dichotomy of "inclusive" and "extractive" institutions too simplistic, to the neglect of state intervention and industrial policies observed widely in East and Southeast Asia. In a nutshell, the Thai case studied here is supportive of the emerging research agenda on within-country growth patterns, but provides an alternative approach to analyzing the politics and economics of policy reform in developing countries.
